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Studies of wealth inequality often assume that an observed wealth distribution reflects a system
in equilibrium. This constraint is rarely tested empirically. We introduce a simple model that allows
equilibrium but does not assume it. To geometric Brownian motion (GBM) we add reallocation:
all individuals contribute in proportion to their wealth and receive equal shares of the amount
collected. We fit the reallocation rate parameter required for the model to reproduce observed
wealth inequality in the United States from 1917 to 2012. We find that this rate was positive until
the 1980s, after which it became negative and of increasing magnitude. With negative reallocation,
the system cannot equilibrate. Even with the positive reallocation rates observed, equilibration is
too slow to be practically relevant. Therefore, studies which assume equilibrium must be treated
skeptically. By design they are unable to detect the dramatic conditions found here when data are
analysed without this constraint.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.40.Jc, 02.50.Ey
THE MODEL – REALLOCATING GBM
Our model of personal wealth is geometric Brown-
ian motion (GBM) enhanced with a simple reallocation
mechanism. The wealth of the ith individual as a function
of time, xi (t), in a population of N individuals follows
the stochastic differential equation,
dxi = xi (µdt+ σdWi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth
− xiτdt+ 〈x〉N τdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
reallocation
. (1)
dxi is the change in wealth over the time period,
dt. dWi is the increment in a Wiener process, which
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
dt. We refer to the parameters µ as the drift, σ as
the volatility, and τ as the reallocation rate. Angled
brackets with subscript N denote the sample mean, i.e.
〈x〉N =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi.
The term labelled ‘growth’ in Eq. (1) is the wealth in-
crement in a GBM. It is a random proportion of xi, con-
sisting of a certain part, xiµdt, and an uncertain part,
xiσdWi. On its own this term generates noisy exponen-
tial growth.
The ‘reallocation’ term works as follows: each indi-
vidual contributes xiτdt, an amount proportional to its
wealth, and receives 〈x〉N τdt, an equal share of the sum
of all contributions. For τ > 0, low-wealth individuals
with xi < 〈x〉N are net recipients under this mechanism,
while high-wealth individuals with xi > 〈x〉N are net
contributors. For τ < 0, the roles are reversed.
We call this model reallocating geometric Brownian
motion (RGBM) to distinguish it from GBM, to which
it reduces when τ = 0. Equation (1) may also be written
as
dxi = xi (µdt+ σdWi)− τ (xi − 〈x〉N ) dt, (2)
which shows that RGBM can be viewed as GBM with
reversion to the sample mean at rate |τ | if τ is positive,
and repulsion from the sample mean at rate |τ | if τ is
negative. Figure 1 depicts typical individual trajectories
produced by the RGBM model with positive, zero, and
negative reallocation (respectively τ > 0, τ = 0, τ < 0).
Regimes of RGBM
The RGBM model produces qualitatively different be-
haviour for different model parameters, population sizes,
and timescales. There are three important regimes char-
acterised by the value of τ . In the following discussion,
as in Fig. 1, we let all individuals start with wealth of
one dollar, xi(0) = $1.
τ = 0 Without reallocation the model is GBM, whose
properties are well known (see, for example, [1]).
Wealth follows a lognormal distribution which
broadens indefinitely over time. There is no sta-
tionary non-zero distribution to which it converges.
In relative terms (i.e. on logarithmic wealth scales)
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FIG. 1: Simulations of RGBM with N = 1000, µ = 0.021 year−1, σ = 0.14 year−1/2, xi (0) = $1. Effect of reallocation
parameter τ . Top left: τ = 0 year−1, inequality grows indefinitely. Magenta lines denote the largest and smallest wealths. The
distribution of individual wealth, on logarithmic scales, is symmetric about the median exp
[(
µ− σ2/2
)
t
]
(black) rather than
the sample mean (green). Blue lines illustrate five randomly chosen wealth trajectories. Top right: τ = 0.1 year−1, inequality
grows initially but is limited by reallocation. The distribution of individual wealth is confined around the sample mean (green),
〈x〉N ≈ exp (µt). Bottom left: same as top left, zoomed in, and on a linear wealth scale. Bottom middle: same as top right,
zoomed in, and on a linear wealth scale. Bottom right: τ = −0.1 year−1, the system is in a qualitatively different regime in
which wealth can become negative.
the wealth distribution is symmetric about the me-
dian, exp
[(
µ− σ2/2
)
t
]
.
GBM exhibits an extreme form of a phenomenon
known as wealth condensation [2]: over time a
measure-zero proportion of the population ends up
with a measure-one proportion of wealth. In prac-
tical terms, this corresponds to one person holding
all the wealth, i.e. perfect inequality.
τ > 0 RGBM becomes equivalent to the model of cooper-
ation in [3] as τ →∞. In this limit, all individuals
have equal wealth which is well approximated by
exp
[(
µ− σ2/2N
)
t
]
. For N and σ appropriate to
human populations, this is very close to exp (µt).
For finite τ , wealths disperse. However, their distri-
bution remains confined around the sample mean,
〈x〉N , to which they are connected by the reallo-
cation mechanism. For realistic model parameters,
populations and timescales, 〈x〉N ≈ exp (µt). The
wealth distribution broadens as τ → 0+ to resemble
that of GBM.
The wealth distribution for RGBM with τ > 0 is
stationary and non-vanishing, with some diverging
moments. As τ increases, successively higher mo-
ments become finite as the distribution becomes
more closely confined around the sample mean.
τ < 0 For negative reallocation the dynamics of RGBM
are qualitatively different. While τ ≥ 0 guar-
antees positive wealth for everyone, with τ < 0
the reallocation mechanism pushes individuals with
xi < 〈x〉N into negative wealth. The creation of
large wealths is fuelled not only by multiplicative
growth but also by direct transfers from the poor,
whose wealths become increasingly negative. No
stationary wealth distribution exists. In practi-
cal terms this corresponds to creditors and debtors
whose wealths diverge exponentially away from the
sample mean.
3Interpretation of τ
In the GBM model (i.e. τ = 0), some individuals in a
population would see their wealth grow over a short time
period, while others would see it shrink. It might look
like wealth is being transferred between individuals but,
mechanistically in the model, these apparent transfers
are the results of random fluctuations.
We wish to model a population of individuals whose
wealths are connected through social and economic struc-
tures such as governments and markets. Such a popu-
lation will likely exhibit resource allocation that is not
captured by GBM alone. The mechanism we introduce
to model these interactions creates systematic transfers
of wealth between individuals. We stress that these are
over and above the apparent transfers observed in a pop-
ulation whose wealths follow GBM.
Our reallocation mechanism has many possible corre-
spondences to aspects of real economies. With τ > 0
it resembles a flat wealth tax with equal redistribution,
while with τ < 0 it is akin to the collection of rents.
Governments collect taxes and spend revenues on wel-
fare and public goods. Therefore, we might surmise that
the net effect of the public sector is to reallocate from
richer to poorer (τ > 0). However, it is not clear who
benefits most from public spending. The richer might
benefit disproportionately from a legal system to protect
property rights; or from centrally-funded infrastructure,
such as power and transport networks, which they use
not only personally but also to further commercial inter-
ests.
Likewise, it is unclear who benefits most from the pri-
vate sector. The flows of wealth to owners of assets which
provide essential services – such as houses, supermarkets,
and telephone networks – look like negative reallocation
(τ < 0). Everyone pays for the services at a fixed rate and
the ‘rents’ thus collected are distributed in proportion to
wealth. On the other hand, the procurers of the services
may derive a net benefit from them, and the provision of
such services usually requires the payment of wages, i.e.
fixed-rate disbursements to many people.
The argument who benefits more cannot be settled by
long lists of examples. It should be addressed empirically.
We find a single time-varying value of τ – an effective re-
allocation rate summarising the net action of all parts of
the economy, both public and private – which best de-
scribes observed wealth inequalities in the United States.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
Estimating µ
We estimate µ from historical private wealth data for
the US [4] by dividing the total private wealth by the to-
tal population size. In the analysed data “private wealth
[...] is the net wealth (assets minus liabilities) of house-
holds and non-profit institutions serving households. [...]
Assets include all the non-financial assets – land, build-
ings, machines, and so on – and financial assets, including
life insurance and pensions funds, over which ownership
rights can be enforced and that provide economic benefits
to their owners” [4, p. 1268].
Starting at t0 = 1917 years AD, we assume the average
historical private wealth follows exp [µ (t− t0)] and find
µ = 0.021± 0.001 year−1 using a least-squares regression
(Fig. 2). For the timescale of interest, about 100 years,
the growth rate of the population average is about the
growth rate of the expectation value, since the population
is large enough (see Model section and also [1] and [5]).
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FIG. 2: Historical wealth per capita in the US (blue) and
fitted exponential function with µ = 0.021 year−1 (red). Data
from [4].
Estimating σ
For each year we estimate σ(t) as the standard devi-
ation of daily logarithmic changes, annualised by mul-
tiplying by (250/year)1/2, of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (data from Quandl database [6]). The values
usually lie within the range 0.1−0.2 year−
1
2 , with an av-
erage of 0.16. Using a fixed σ within the range 0.1− 0.2
has little effect on our results.
Inferring τ
Our key interest is to fit a time series, τ (t), that re-
produces the annually observed wealth shares in [7]. The
wealth share Sq is defined as the proportion of total
wealth,
∑N
i xi, owned by the richest fraction q of the
4population, e.g. S10% = 80% means that the richest 10%
of the population own 80% of the total wealth.
For an empirical wealth share time series, Sdataq (t), we
proceed as follows.
Step 1 Initialize N individual wealths, {xi(t0)}, as random
variates of a lognormal distribution1 whose param-
eters are chosen to match Sdataq (t0).
Step 2 Propagate {xi (t)} according to Eq. (1) over ∆t = 1
year, using the value of τ that minimizes the dif-
ference between the wealth share in the modelled
population, Smodelq (t + ∆t, τ), and S
data
q (t + ∆t).
We use the Nelder-Mead algorithm [9].
Step 3 Repeat Step 2 until the end of the time series in
2012.
We consider historical wealth shares of the richest q =
10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.01% and obtain time
series of fitted effective reallocation rates, τq (t), shown
in Fig. 3. For each value of q we perform 10 independent
runs of the simulation for N = 106 and average over
the obtained results. Since in practice dW is randomly
chosen, each run of the simulation will result in slightly
different τq (t) values. However, the differences between
such calculations are negligible. We observe a short spin-
up period of approximately 3 years, after which τq (t) is
no longer sensitive to the initial distribution.
Figure 3 shows large annual changes in τq (t). We are
interested in longer-term changes in reallocation driven
by structural economic and political changes. To eluci-
date these we take a central moving average, τ˜q (t), with
a 10-year window truncated at the ends of the time se-
ries. This smoothing reveals a recognizable history of
wealth reallocation, e.g. the stock-market boom of the
1920s which benefited wealthy shareholders (τ˜q (t) < 0)
and the social programs of the New Deal (τ˜q (t) > 0).
The most important observation is that the effective
reallocation rate has been negative since the mid-1980s.
To test the robustness of this finding we repeated the
analysis for other inequality measures: the Gini coef-
ficient, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic of the wealth
cumulative distribution function, and the Lorenz curve
based on Sdataq (t). This makes little difference: the same
behaviour of τ˜ (t), including the substantial negative val-
ues from the 1980s onward, is obtained for all inequality
measures we analysed.
To ensure that the smoothing does not introduce ar-
tificial biases, we reversed the procedure and used τ˜q (t)
to propagate the initial lognormally distributed {xi (t0)}
1 The lognormal is a reasonable representation of observed distri-
butions [8], and is generated by Eq. (1) for τ = 0. Our results
do not depend strongly on the initial distribution.
and determine the wealth shares Smodelq (t). The good
agreement with Sdataq (t) suggests that the smoothed
τ˜q (t) is meaningful, see Fig. 3.
DISCUSSION
GBM, without reallocation, is a model of an economy
without social structure. Wealth inequality in this model
increases indefinitely. We considered this unrealistic, and
expected the net effect of real social institutions to be
reflected in positive τ . Therefore, the negative realloca-
tion rates we found came as a shock. We didn’t imagine
that explicitly reallocative structures such as taxation
and welfare spending had been overridden to the point
of reversal.
Having said that, with realistic parameters σ and µ,
and non-negative τ everyone gets wealthier over time un-
der the RGBM model. Therefore the recent observation
that “the wealth owned by the bottom half of humanity
has fallen by a trillion dollars in the past five years” [10,
p. 2] is consistent with negative τ , not only in the US but
also globally.
Studies of inequality often make the following assump-
tions that go under the headings of equilibrium, ergodic-
ity, stationarity, or stability.
A. The system can equilibrate, i.e. a stationary dis-
tribution exists to which the observed distribution
converges in the long-time limit. For example, a
recent study states: “We impose assumptions [...]
that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a
limit stationary distribution” [11, p. 130].
B. The system equilibrates quickly, i.e. the observed
distribution gets close to the stationary distribution
after a time shorter than the timescale of observa-
tion. This assumption is often left unstated, but it
is necessary for the stationary distribution to have
practical relevance.
Such studies fit parameters of the stationary distribu-
tion which reproduce observed inequality. For example,
a researcher would observe a wealth share and then find
the reallocation rate, τeqmq , for which the model produces
the same wealth share in the long-time limit.
We do not make the equilibrium assumptions. Fitting
τ in RGBM allows the data to speak without constraint
as to whether the assumptions are valid. We find them
to be invalid because:
A. The system cannot equilibrate for τ ≤ 0. The
model generates a non-stationary distribution and
running it for longer produces greater inequality.
B. The system does not equilibrate quickly for realistic
parameters. The shortest equilibration time we in-
ferred from τ˜10% was approximately 50 years when
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FIG. 3: Fitted effective reallocation rates using µ = 0.021 year−1 and Dow-Jones-derived σ (t). Top left: τ10% (t) (black) and
τ˜10% (t) (red). Top right: τ0.01% (t) (black) and τ˜0.01% (t) (magenta). Translucent envelopes indicate one standard error in the
moving averages. Bottom left: τ˜ (t)q reproducing the wealth shares listed in the legend. Bottom right: S
data
10% (blue), S
model
10%
based on the annual τ10% (t) (dashed black), based on the 10-year moving average τ˜10% (t) (red).
τ˜10% was at its maximum of 0.02 year
−1. This is
much longer than the observation time of one year.2
Figure 4 contrasts τeqm
10%
(t) as would be found in an
equilibrium study with τ˜10% (t) as found in this study. If
equilibration were always possible and fast, then the two
values would be identical within statistical uncertainties.
They are not.
The equilibrium assumptions preclude what we find
2 The equilibration time was estimated as the exponential rate of
convergence of the variance of the distribution of relative wealth
xi/ 〈x〉N to its asymptotic value for prevailing levels of τ and σ.
in this study, namely reallocation rates that correspond
to wealth distributions which are either non-stationary
(τ˜q (t) ≤ 0) or which equilibrate slowly (all observed
τ˜q (t) > 0). Currently (i.e. in 2012, the latest year of
available data) the system is in a state best described
in RGBM by τ < 0. Each time we observe it, we see a
snapshot of a distribution in the process of diverging. It
is much like taking a photo of an explosion in space: it
will show a fireball whose finite extent tells us nothing of
the eventual distance between pieces of debris. Studies
– of both fireballs and inequality – that assume equilib-
rium must be treated skeptically, as they are incapable of
detecting the dramatic conditions one finds without this
assumption.
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FIG. 4: Comparison of dynamic and equilibrium reallocation rates. Left: τ˜10% (t) (red, same as in the top left of Fig. 3). τ
eqm
10%
(t)
(green), defined such that limt′→∞ S
model
10%
(
t′, τ eqm
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(t)
)
= Sdata10% (t). It is impossible by design for this value to be negative. The
significant difference between the red and green lines demonstrates that the equilibrium assumption is invalid for the problem
under consideration. Right: Sdata10% (blue), S
model
10% based on the 10-year moving average τ˜10% (t) (red), based on τ
eqm
10%
(t) (green).
The reallocation rates found under equilibrium assumptions generate model wealth shares which bear little relation to reality.
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